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7 Roles and actions of leadership
Brazil and the South American others
Leslie Wehner
Introduction
Leadership is key to understanding the emergence and future consolidation of 
regional powers both in their own regions and at the global level. Recent works 
on new regional powers have emphasized the need to study leadership and the 
lack of followership, or of contestation to the aspiration of these powers that is 
intended to change the asymmetric representation in multilateral institutions 
such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as well as gain more 
influential positions in these institutions (see Schirm 2010; Flemes 2010; 
Malamud 2009). Whereas leadership is defined in these scholarly works in terms 
of material capabilities (hard power) and soft power, they lack a clear characteri-
zation of which types of leadership the regional power relies on when it ‘acts’ at 
both the regional and global levels.
 Stefan Schirm (2010) focuses, for example, on Brazil’s aspirations at the 
global level, but pays little attention to how the role of leader is conceived and 
performed, as well as contested, ignored and followed by other actors at the 
regional level. Focusing on one contester of regional power leadership may be 
considered an important initial step in the conceptualization of the dyadic lead-
ership–followership of Brazil–Argentina and of Germany–Italy, as Stefan 
Schirm does. However, what remains to be seen is the permutations of follow-
ership and non- followership among actors from the same region as that of the 
regional power, and at both levels – the regional and the global. The challenge 
of including different potential followers – achieved by studying both leader-
ship and lack of followership, for Brazil’s case – is taken on by Andrés 
Malamud (2009: 131), who rightly asserts that the quest to understand Brazil’s 
regional influence in South America has been conducted with ‘velvet gloves’, 
or through soft power, and that the study of the harder side of power has been 
restricted to only the global stage. Daniel Flemes (2010: 100) also mentions that 
Brazil’s leadership in South America has been regarded as that of a passive 
regional power, which is similar to Sean Burges’ (2006) description of Brazil’s 
leadership as lacking both ‘sticks and carrots’. The latter also develops the 
concept of consensual hegemony as a structure in which dominance and 
coercion are not part of the power project of the regional power. Consensual 
972 07 Regional Powers 07.indd   137 3/3/11   12:53:09
T &
 F 
Pr
oo
f
138  L. Wehner
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
hegemony is about ‘the creation of consensus through the constructive inclu-
sion of potentially competing priorities and the shaping of common positive 
outcomes’ (Burges 2008: 81).
 If Brazil’s consensual hegemonic project is about reaching consensus on posi-
tions and courses of action with other neighbouring states, then what types of 
leadership(s) does a consensus- seeking hegemon use to both create and to 
sustain this type of hegemonic structure? What this approach lacks is an appreci-
ation of the dynamic side of leadership and its forms. In other words, if Brazil 
lacks ‘sticks and carrots’, and can be depicted as masterminding a consensual 
hegemonic project in the South American region as well as reserving its harder 
means for the global level, then which type of leadership is Brazil relying on 
when it performs the role of leader, both in South America and at the global 
level? Moreover, if self- role conception – including leaderships roles – does not 
exist without others – including follower roles – then the question must be asked: 
how do other South American states see Brazil’s role conception and actions at 
both of these levels?
 This chapter explores the connections between role theory and leadership 
theory – the latter mainly, yet not exclusively, being used in negotiation theory – 
from an actor- centred perspective. The purpose of this is, first, to systematize the 
role of leader, by using different types of leadership in order to avoid the risks 
resultant from treating leadership not as a role but as an umbrella concept in the 
study of regional powers. The second function of this chapter is to illustrate the 
theoretical dimensions, giving a brief overview of Brazil’s role conceptions – 
and the views of others about Brazil’s role conception(s) – as well as its actions 
in political and security matters as a regional power, both in South America and 
at the global level.
 I argue that leadership is multifaceted and can be played out as a role in many 
different ways – such as roles of entrepreneurial, intellectual and structural 
leadership – and by different actors on the regional or on the international stage, 
because leadership is an ‘activity’ that under certain conditions can be shared. 
Yet, this sharing of leadership is more plausible and possible when entrepreneur-
ial means are emphasized in the discursive articulation and actions of the leader-
ship role, rather than when the construction of a role of leader is based on 
structural means, and when such structural leadership excludes the regional 
others through its rejection of shared leadership. Structural leadership is not, 
necessarily, the equal translation of material capabilities or hard power into hard 
leadership nor is it an objective measure, since such objectivity is discursively 
articulated.
 In my view, the roles of leadership are constructed both in reference to and 
with others, as well as possessing the capacity to be performed through different 
types of leadership. This co- constitution of the role of leader in a relational way 
between the self and the other is not exempt of role conflicts, as the views of 
states about what leadership is may diverge in their essence, as well as being 
dependent on the context in which such a role is performed – be it in regional or 
global social settings. In other words, exerting leadership does not always secure 
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Brazil and the South American others  139
the achievement of foreign policy goals as leadership may be contested and/or 
ignored. Thus, the co- constitution of roles beyond leader – that is, potential 
followers are allies, balancers, bandwagoners, free riders and/or exist as 
independents – does not mean the automatic subordination of others’ roles, in a 
hierarchical sense, as the ignoring and contesting of leadership implies a certain 
equality and horizontality in some of the roles performed by others.
 The importance of studying self- role conceptions and the external views and 
actions of a regional power is that they might provide insight into how regional 
others judge Brazil as both a regional and as a global actor. The view of others is 
an understudied aspect in the literature of both role theory – where the self- 
conception has predominated (see Holsti 1970; Walker 1987a; Grossman 2005)1 
– and of regional powers. Second, assessing roles as a co- constitutive process 
between the self and the other may shed light on how Brazil translates its foreign 
policy goals into outcomes, as well as further illuminating some of the factors 
that hamper the realization of them. Third, the role expectations of others that 
emerge from the social articulation of roles, their rejection and/or any indiffer-
ence to them influence and affect Brazil’s role performance both in the South 
American region and globally.
 In the following section, I give a description of what role theory is and its 
main concepts. Then, I introduce leadership as a concept and the typology 
developed by Oran Young (1991), which has been broadly used in negotiation 
theory. I also link Young’s typology of leadership to role theory. As Young’s 
work is presented in behavioural terms and with more emphasis on the perspec-
tive of the self (ego), I highlight the social dimension of leadership. Leadership 
as a role cannot exist if there is not an other (alter) that plays the part of role 
sender (cf. Nabers 2010a), and if there are not expectations that emerge during 
this process of discursive co- constitution between leaders and the different type 
of followers or non- followers.
 In the last part of this chapter, I focus on Brazil’s role conception and then on 
the actions it takes when it performs the roles of leadership. I then assess whether 
the types of leadership chosen at both the regional and global levels are consist-
ent or not with the self- conceptions and expectations of others, as well as how 
others see Brazil as a regional power in three key areas: regional integration; 
conflict resolution; Brazil’s aspiration to gain a permanent seat in the UNSC. 
These others, in this work, are secondary regional powers from within South 
America. Secondary powers, and not small powers, have the ability to facilitate, 
hamper and challenge the emergence, consolidation and performance of Brazil’s 
roles. Thus, I focus on the views of Brazil held by Argentina and Chile – the 
latter is a significantly understudied power within the South American context.
 Argentina and Chile have been labelled, along with Venezuela, as secondary 
regional powers (cf. Flemes 2010; Flemes and Wojczewski 2010). These two 
authors have conceptualized the term secondary regional powers to focus on 
material attributes as a sine qua non for being a secondary regional power: that 
is, military and economic resources. Once this conceptualization is achieved, 
they introduce ideas and norms only as part of the strategies for leadership 
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and/or (non-) followership. Thus Flemes and Wojczewski (2010) overlook the 
social and relational dimension of power as a constitutive process of role forma-
tion and role enactment. However, roles are not only achievements for a state 
because of its material resources, but they are also constructed through a con-
stant social interaction between the self and the other in inter- state relations.
Types of leadership as roles
Role theory provides an elaborate set of concepts that can be used in the analysis 
of foreign policy and international relations as it possesses descriptive, organiza-
tional and explanatory value (see Walker 1987b: 2). Moreover, it also allows us 
to link agent and structure (see Aggestam 2004: 57–62; Thies 2010: 7–8), as 
well as to focus on different levels of analysis – be these the individual, the state 
and/or the systemic level (Thies 2010: 5–7). The roles that an actor engages in 
are not a mechanistic process of enacting or playing different roles depending on 
what situation the actor faces. It is certainly not about choosing without limita-
tions from a basket of multiple roles. Roles are for sure contextually determined; 
yet, roles are also patterns of expected and socially learnt behaviour that emerge 
out of the social interactions between the self and the other (cf. Elgström and 
Smith 2006: 5; Aggestam 2004: 65). ‘Role theory assumes . . . that states are 
“actors” who behave consistent with specific roles with which they identify’ 
(Chafetz et al. 1996: 732).
 The taking on of a role is not only a behaviouralist act, but is also grounded 
in the identity held by the actors that perform that role. As Dirk Nabers (2010a: 
9) argues, ‘Roles are therefore the basis of identities, but are the same time filled 
with meaning through identity, or . . . identification. Identity means the incorpo-
ration of the meanings and expectations associated with a role into the self.’ In 
other words, the taking of a role is part of the intersubjective dialoguing/conflict-
ing between the self- role conception and the role expectations and prescriptions 
of other actors, as well as the role conceptions of those others (cf. Holsti 1970: 
238–9). In the construction, and performance, of roles, as a social process, there 
is a constant struggle for recognition about the roles states have and play (cf. 
Wendt 2003: 510–20). Thus, role taking as a one- way street does not exist, as 
the self- role concepts and the performance of those roles are usually socially 
articulated in reference to a counter- role (Thies 2010: 3).
 Such a counter- role is not necessarily, or always, an opposing role; in fact, in 
some instances it may complement the self, as for example, when two or more 
states exert agreed joint structural, intellectual or entrepreneurial leaderships, in 
which both actors are performing the roles of leaders. What role theory has to 
offer for an empirical analysis of regions and regional powers is the develop-
ment of the ideational basis of external policies and the concerns and concrete 
external actions – in this case, of Brazil as a regional power and its ‘potential’ 
regional followers (cf. Elgström and Smith 2006). It also allows us to assess how 
role- identity discourses and actions shape, maintain and transform a structure of 
inter- state social relations in a regional setting.
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Brazil and the South American others  141
 The self- role conception is the ego’s own definition, and it defines respon-
sibilities and obligations of the self in foreign policy matters (Aggestam 2004: 
64; Holsti 1970: 12). It is the product of a nation’s socialization process that is 
influenced by societal characteristics (Holsti 1970; Grossman 2005). However, a 
self- role conception is also shaped by the role prescription and role expectations 
of others (Elgström and Smith 2006: 6). A self- conception indicates what the 
limits of proper behaviour are, when a role is performed. Role prescription or 
role expectations ‘pertains to those expectations that other actors (alter) pre-
scribe and expect the role- beholder (ego) to enact’ (Aggestam 2004: 64).2 As a 
state can adopt different roles from within its role set – and because the more 
roles one state has the better it is prepared for social life – then role enactment is 
the effort and amount of time spent in a role vis- à-vis the other roles in a state 
repertoire (see Thies 2010: 2–3; Thies 2001). Finally, role performance is 
defined as the actual behaviour of actors or how a role is played. The perform-
ance character of a role also depends upon external views – that is, the expecta-
tions of others about how and within which limits the enactment of a role should 
be performed or played either at the regional and/or the global level (cf. Elg-
ström and Smith 2006: 6; Aggestam 2004: 65–6).
 Leadership, for role theory, is a performative act. Leadership as a concept is 
an elusive one and it is highly contested in international relations, despite the 
fact that it is a constitutive element of all spheres of politics (Young 1991). 
Leaders seek recognition, status and power to advance collective purposes. 
Despite a leader having a self- interest in achieving common goals by mobilizing 
followers and convincing others to follow, such interest may have to be down-
graded or moderated through the articulation of a discourse with a sense of fair-
ness and flexibility, so as to accommodate others’ interests and in order to make 
compromises and adjustments necessary to achieve the desired goal (cf. Deese 
2008: 22). For James Burns (1979: 134), leadership is not always about bringing 
together opposing interests; it is also about detecting common positions and 
interests that have not yet been mobilized. Thus, ‘leaders have a special role as 
activators, initiators, mobilizers’.
 Talking about leadership as a role under one generic label has the risk of 
making leadership (leader) an umbrella term. In this sense, Oran Young (1991) 
has contributed to the development of the role of leadership in international rela-
tions by pinpointing its different faces and forms in institutional negotiation set-
tings. Leadership is a key variable in understanding success and failure in 
international negotiations (Young 1991: 281; Deese 2008). Young develops 
three types of leadership to analyse international bargaining settings. These three 
proposed types of leadership are: structural, intellectual and entrepreneurial. 
Structural leadership is exercised by the state and its officials, who hold the most 
resources (Deese 2008: 25–34). Young (1991: 289) refers to structural leader-
ship as the translation of material capabilities into leverage for the bargaining 
process. The most common way to exert this type of leadership and to attract 
followers is through the promise of material rewards and the use of threats. In 
order to get things done in a negotiation setting – for example, to conclude an 
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agreement successfully – the promise of rewards or sanctions should be carefully 
crafted and have credibility for the others (Young 1991: 290).
 Structural leadership allows for coalition- building to achieve the goals of the 
leader (Nabers 2010b: 58). In addition, structural leadership may be exerted in 
joint ventures, as has been the case in some WTO negotiations rounds in which 
the EU and the US have pursued shared goals to gain more leverage by utilizing 
their respective material capabilities (see Deese 2008: 84–125). However, the 
essence of this type of leadership is self- serving purposes, or, as Malnes (1995: 
106), asserts ‘[it] boils down to clever bargaining spurred mainly by self- 
interest’. In other words, the role of a structural leader can be understood as a 
self- serving enterprise in which ‘followers’ are seen as instrumental actors that 
also have similar interests in a particular course of action and in a specific 
outcome. It is also about changing and enforcing the goals and the positions of 
potential followers to match or suit those of the structural leader(s). In both 
cases, using ‘carrots and sticks’ are fundamental strategies to mobilize followers 
behind the leader.
 Whereas the exertion of structural and entrepreneurial leadership can be 
attributed to states and their representatives, for Young intellectual leadership is 
an exclusively individual attribute that may have a connection to states or other 
types of corporate identities (see Young 1991: 298). However, states and inter-
national organizations such as the OECD, as a consequence of them having 
corporate identities, may also exert intellectual leadership. In this sense, intellec-
tual leadership relies on the use of expert knowledge to shape the way of think-
ing of principals in international affairs. This form of leadership can be displayed 
by officials, states, epistemic organizations as well as epistemic communities. 
Young says that an ‘[i]ntellectual leader is an individual – [state, or organiza-
tion] – who produces intellectual capital or generative systems of thought that 
shape the perspectives of those who participate in institutional bargaining’.3 This 
form of leadership can also be exercised in other social settings, as it is a reflec-
tive or deliberative process of exchanging arguments (Nabers 2010b: 58).
 The third variety of leadership is entrepreneurial leadership, which ‘relies on 
negotiating skills to frame issues in ways that foster integrative bargaining and 
to put together deals that would otherwise elude participants’ (Young 1991: 
293). This leadership involves the ability to convince and attract the counterpart 
towards an agreement. Persuading the counterpart to change their initial choices 
without positive or negative enforcements is a component of entrepreneurial 
leadership. Yet, it is also about mobilizing actors with common interests who are 
still passive and who have not yet joined together for the realization of such 
commonly perceived goals. This type of leadership is about bridging, mediating 
and acting as an honest broker through the use of consensual reasoning and 
skills.
 Therefore, leadership is not only ‘the ability to make others follow goals and 
positions which these others did not previously share’ (Schirm 2010: 200), but it 
is also the ability to detect and initiate common actions based on extant shared 
goals. Leadership is not only based on power and resources, as Schirm defines 
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the term, conflating power and leadership. A leader, from a state- centred per-
spective, is not only a leader because it is stronger than the other or because it 
has more political and economic weight than the counterpart to change the fol-
lower’s mind or course of action (cf. Deese 2008: 35). Leadership is also about 
persuading the counterpart, as much as it is about creating the need of the self 
and the other to achieve mutually satisfactory outcomes and/or common regional 
and/or global goods. This type of leadership is consensual in its essence, as it is 
about attracting and persuading, without enforcing.
 As Burges (2006, 2008) contends, with regard to hegemony rather than to 
leadership, states like Brazil can also act without using ‘sticks and carrots’. 
Leadership is the other side that co- constitutes hegemony in whichever form 
hegemony takes. Entrepreneurial leadership is selves- serving (self–other) rather 
than self- serving (the self ), as structural leadership is. It also entails a principle 
of the joint taking of responsibility for the benefit of the shared regional space 
that the different states occupy. Entrepreneurial leadership includes interests of 
the self and the other, socializes them and shares them. Mutuality is key in this 
type of leadership, both in its origin and in its performance. Entrepreneurial 
leaders also have an interest, or are at least biased, towards the pursuit of a par-
ticular course of action or a goal; yet, it does not enforce the follower to follow 
its particular interests or stakes.
 This separation of types of leadership is far from perfect, as Malnes has 
argued (1995: 106–7), but it still offers some positive elements that shed light 
on, and systematize, the role conception of Brazil, both in South America and on 
the global stage. Moreover, it also allows greater specificity of the roles that 
Brazil is engaged in under the label of leadership(s), as well as clarity about its 
role performance in relation to, and with, other South American states. The exer-
tion of these types of leadership does not automatically and always secure fol-
lowership. Yet, what the study of these variants of leadership can offer is an 
analytical systematization of the self- role conception, role expectations and role 
actions/performance based on the acceptance, rejection or indifference when the 
roles of leaders in these three forms are enacted.
 A gap in Young’s theoretical approach to leadership is that he constantly 
refers to this term as a role in international affairs, yet he does not provide a 
further elaboration on the role of leader from a role theory perspective. Also, he 
does not link its typology with role theory. When Young refers to the term role 
he is not using it as a synonym for influence as most literature on international 
relations does. Quite the contrary, he refers to leadership as a multifaceted action 
and to the leaders – be these individuals or states – as those who act (see Young 
1991: 285, 287–8, 307). Thus, what follows is a linkage of role theory and the 
different types of leadership, especially in its structural and entrepreneurial 
variants.
 As leadership is multifaceted, it will be argued here that the three types of 
leadership developed by Young (1991) are roles in their own right. In this 
regard, role theory has not further developed the role of leader, rendering it an 
umbrella term. Leadership as one amorphous role without emphasis on its 
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constitutive differences lacks clarity on what is acceptable or not for other states 
in the region from which the regional power comes; that is, the kind of leader-
ship attributed and accepted by others. These other states may be more welcom-
ing of one of the roles of leadership played by the regional power than of the 
others. In addition, there may be distinctive characteristics when a state like 
Brazil plays one of the roles of leadership either at the regional or global level. A 
regional power like Brazil may also spend more time enacting and using one 
type of leadership over others, thereby making the different forms of leadership 
roles in their own right.
 Furthermore, treating Young’s typology as independent roles also allows us 
to reduce, in an analytical sense and for the study of regional powers, the extant 
ambiguity between the role of leader and that of a mediator/facilitator, which can 
also be attributed to a regional power when it acts in its neighbourhood. Mediat-
ing involves being a leader, specifically in the entrepreneurial and structural 
forms. When playing the role of structural leader, or entrepreneurial leader, it 
can be said that the distinctiveness of the role of a mediator becomes blurred, as 
what ‘the mediator’ is exerting is actually the role of either structural or entre-
preneurial leadership. Exerting mediation as a structural or entrepreneurial leader 
depends on whether the mediating party utilizes ‘sticks and carrots’, or employs 
persuasion and consensual skills to achieve the peaceful resolution of a conflict.
 Ole Elgström (2007: 449) highlights that the role of mediator is close to that 
of leadership, and that mediators are supposed to be impartial, while leaders 
usually have an agenda or an interest. However, when leaderships are used as 
roles beyond negotiation theory, a leader can mediate by using its leadership 
roles to solve internal conflicts in a third country or between two countries, with 
the purpose of preventing direct (negative) consequences for the leader. A leader 
– structural or entrepreneurial – may have a stake, or at least be biased, in the 
matter in which it is mediating and yet still be able to produce change and 
deliver a successful outcome (Jönsson 2002: 222). A pertinent example might be 
regions and regional conflicts in which a regional power can act as a leader by 
mediating or facilitating an agreement between two conflicting parties. The 
interests of the regional power that is acting as either a structural or as an entre-
preneurial leader are first to achieve a peaceful resolution to conflicts within a 
state or between states that may affect the status or reputation of the regional 
power as a leader able to keep peace in its region. Second, another interest may 
be the prevention of external involvement, which might undermine the regional 
power’s role conception of itself as a leader committed to regional peace- 
keeping; the expectations of regional others towards the regional power; and the 
future role performances as both a structural and entrepreneurial leader. In other 
words, mediating may be incorporated into the ways in which entrepreneurial 
and structural leaderships roles are performed in a regional and/or global order.
 Therefore, a regional power can self- define, and others can prescribe, accept 
and reject different roles of leaderships, depending on the context of the situation 
and on the identity of the various actors. Structural, intellectual and entrepre-
neurial leaderships are roles and, as such, may be enacted and performed by a 
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regional power, as well as shared with others, and shaped by others in both 
regional and global settings. As with most roles, an actor can downgrade a role 
from its discourse, and draw from another one in order to articulate and enact a 
new role. However, the formation of a new role is always socialized with and by 
the other states from the beginning of the role formation. These others may also 
accept, or reject, the new role discourse. In other words, a regional power can 
change different leadership roles by creating a discursive need to perform a new 
type of leadership that takes into consideration both the setting and the others. 
This change of leaderships roles – for example, from structural to entrepreneurial 
or vice versa – allows us to understand how a regional power such as Brazil 
plays the roles of leader in its different forms vis- à-vis its regional others. It also 
allows us to systematize the performance of the roles of leadership by an actor, 
as well as elucidating the eventual reasons for both successful and failed out-
comes when the roles of leaderships are played.
South America: Brazil and the others
Brazil’s self- role conceptions and foreign policy actions
Three underlying principles of Brazil’s foreign policy are autonomy, universal-
ism and grandeur. Other key words have also become constitutive of Brazil’s 
foreign policy principles – such as negotiation and pragmatism, as opposites to 
the use of military and economic strength (Fortuna 2007: 15). In addition, Brazil, 
along with the other Latin American countries, has created an international 
society of which two pillars are sovereignty and non- intervention (see Kacowicz 
2000). The principle of autonomy can be described as keeping available the 
country’s room for manoeuvre in its external relations and thus preventing com-
mitments that would bound its future action related to its global actor status. 
Universalism sets as its goal the keeping of harmonic relations with all countries, 
irrespective of the political regime and the economic model of those others (cf. 
Gomes Saraiva and Malamud 2009). Grandeur has been conceived of as part of 
Brazil’s destiny. Brazil’s grandeur was in the past expressed in Brazil’s quest for 
a permanent seat in the League of Nations and in the UNSC, after the First and 
Second World Wars respectively (Mullins 2006: 79). In this regard, these princi-
ples, in a broad sense, and the goals attached to them have remained prominent 
in the foreign policy actions of Brazil.
 However, under the presidencies of Fernando Collor de Melo (1990–92), 
Itamar Franco (1992–94) and Fernando H. Cardoso (1995–2002), the ongoing 
changes of globalization were also integrated into the driving principles of Bra-
zil’s foreign policy. These global changes are synthesized in the principles of 
autonomy through integration and that of shared sovereignty, instead of the tra-
ditional view on sovereignty. The practical side of autonomy through integration 
was the creation of the MERCOSUR community in 1991 (see Vigevani and 
Fernandes de Oliveira 2007: 58–61). The main intention behind the adoption of 
shared sovereignty is the defence of universal values, alongside other countries 
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that share the same worldview, through the formation of international regimes. It 
also promotes Brazil’s proactive participation in international affairs, so as to 
change the distortions of the existing multilateral institutions (Vigevani and 
Fernandes de Oliveira 2007: 62).
 During the second mandate of F.H. Cardoso (1999–2002), Brazil paid more 
attention to its region, as South America was seen as the necessary basis for reach-
ing the status of global player. This involvement in regional affairs was focused on 
the goals of security and democratic stability (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006: 30; 
Gomes Saraiva and Malamud 2009; Turcotte 2008: 793). In this sense, the role of 
entrepreneurial leader was preferred by Brazil for the establishment of stronger 
links with the rest of South America. This role of leader was enacted through creat-
ing the need to have regular presidential summits. Symbolically, the first presiden-
tial summit was held in Brasilia in 2000. Moreover, Brazil also played the role of 
entrepreneurial leader by offering first its mediation skills to end the conflict of 
1995 between Ecuador and Peru, between whom a final peace treaty was eventually 
signed in Brazil’s capital in 1998. Brazil also shared its mediating role in the solu-
tion of this conflict with countries like Argentina, Chile and the United States.
 However, Brazil has also played the role of structural leader in South 
America. First it did it with the creation of the MERCOSUR, in which both 
Brazil and Argentina exerted joint structural leadership. The MERCOSUR’s cre-
ation and maintenance is seen as a shared enterprise between these two countries 
(see Malamud 2009). Playing the shared role of structural leader was also 
exerted by both Brazil and Argentina to impede the return of authoritarianism in 
Paraguay in 1996. The main bargaining chip of these two countries, so as to 
make Paraguayan General Lino Oviedo desist from a coup attempt, was the 
threat of expelling Paraguay from the MERCOSUR (Oelsner 2005: 173), and 
showing the potential negative economic implications of this decision. Brazil 
and Argentina also acted together in subsequent political crises in Paraguay in 
1999 and 2000 (Gratius 2007: 17).
 According to Soares de Lima and Hirst (2006: 30–3), under the presidency of 
Lula da Silva (2003–) Brazil’s quest for South American regional leadership has 
become more salient than ever. Yet, Brazil’s role as an entrepreneurial leader has 
been performed only to mediate in crises if it was called to do so. Thus, Brazil has 
been able to keep the principle of non- intervention by intervening when its mediat-
ing skills are accepted without direct enforcements. For example, Brazil mediated 
in the solution of the impasse that led to an attempted coup d’etat in Venezuela 
(2002), and in the subsequent formation of a ‘group of friends of Venezuela’ 
(2003) to facilitate the dialogue between the government and the opposition. It also 
used its consensus- building skills to solve the constitutional crises in Bolivia and 
Ecuador; it has attracted other South American countries (Chile and Argentina) to 
participate in the peace- keeping mission in Haiti (Turcotte 2008: 795–6), and it 
helped to reduce the tensions between Colombia–Ecuador and Venezuela in 2008 
(Shifter and Siegel 2010: 98–9). These were possible by highlighting the constitu-
tive elements of the role of entrepreneurial leader such as consensus, dialoguing, 
inclusion and non- enforcement.
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 Regarding the UNASUR – created in 2004 and with its constitutive treaty 
signed in 2008 – Brazil has also performed the role of entrepreneurial leader, as 
it articulated the need for an institution that could integrate all South American 
countries; its institutionalization and function have been shared with regional 
others. For example, the permanent Secretariat is supposed to be situated in 
Quito, Ecuador, and the first two pro- temporare presidencies were held by the 
then Chilean president Michelle Bachelet, and by the current Ecuadorian 
president Rafael Correa. In addition, Brazil supported the election of former 
Argentinean president Néstor Kirchner as the UNASUR Secretary- General (La 
Nación 2010).
 Most recently, President Lula and Néstor Kirchner were important actors in 
the re- establishment of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela. 
However, when Presidents Manuel Santos (2010–) and Hugo Chávez (1999–) 
met to resolve the conflict and to re- establish diplomatic relations, only the 
UNASUR Secretary- General was present as a moderator between both parties, 
while the Brazilian leader was not (La Tercera 2010: 13).
 Yet, the accentuated emphasis on the role of entrepreneurial leader has also 
showed some of the limitations of Brazil’s involvement in South America, such 
as the rejection of Brazil’s mediation in what Chile considers to be a bilateral 
problem with Bolivia, over the issue of access to the sea (Wehner 2010a: 17). In 
addition, Brazil did not seek to solve the problem between Argentina and 
Uruguay about the cellulose plants in La Plata. In fact, Brazil did not get 
involved in this issue at all, claiming that it was rather a bilateral matter, and as 
such it did not concern the MERCOSUR or Brazil (see Turcotte 2008: 799–800). 
Moreover, Brazil had to accept Bolivia’s nationalization of Brazil’s main fuel 
company, PETROBAS, since it lacked structural capacity; the latter did not want 
to enact the role of structural leader in order to resolve this issue, for in doing so 
it could be criticized for breaking the principle of non- intervention in a coercive 
way.
 The discursive articulation of the role of entrepreneurial leadership, and the 
constant enactment of such a role vis- à-vis the role of structural leader in Brazil’s 
political agenda, has been based on a process of constantly downgrading and 
downplaying the concept of leadership as a whole at the regional level. Brazil 
understates the key word ‘leadership’ in its official discourse as leadership is 
usually associated with self- serving purposes and coercion in both Brazil’s 
diplomacy and among its potential followers (cf. Burges 2006: 24; Gratius 2007: 
23–5). In this sense, Brazil’s leaders do not want to create a project that implies 
attempts to exert a ‘mini- hegemony’ (Gratius 2006: 7), nor one that appears to 
unfold a hegemonic system that is characterized by domination and coercion 
(Burges 2008: 71).
 One of the famous sentences in the articulation of a discourse that down-
grades the concept of leadership as a key word in Brazil’s official vernacular has 
been expressed in sentences such as: ‘Brazil does not want to lead anything’ (da 
Silva 2006). This has happened alongside the highlighting of the point that 
Brazil is not interested in unfolding a project of hegemony based on coercion 
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and intervention. At the same time, Brazil presents itself as being concerned with 
political developments that may trigger crisis in, and bring instability to, the 
South American countries. To allow for Brazil’s involvement in crisis manage-
ment, without contradicting the declared principle of non- intervention, this 
country has included in its discourse and in its constitution of the role of entre-
preneurial leader the word ‘non- indifference’ as a defining element of its foreign 
policy actions. ‘[We] do not believe in external interference in internal affairs, 
but we do not seek refuge in omission and indifference before problems that 
affect our neighbours’ (Lula da Silva 2004, quoted in Spektor 2010: 194).
 Globally, Brazil has performed the role of structural leader as the only viable 
way of gaining a permanent seat in the UNSC. Brazil presented this aspiration in 
a concerted alliance with Germany, India and Japan – in a group known as G4. 
Despite the lack of, and in some cases ambiguous, regional support for a perma-
nent seat in the UNSC, Brazil has performed the role of structural leader. In this 
sense, the role of structural leader for this institutional setting has been effected 
without sharing the role with its South American counterparts. The non- sharing 
part is that the permanent seat is only for Brazil, whereas countries like Argen-
tina and Mexico would prefer more non- permanent seats instead, or a permanent 
seat with a rotating system for Latin America, and if that is not possible then for 
there to be no changes at all in the UNSC (see Malamud 2009; Schirm 2010; 
Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006: 29). Enacting the role of structural leader at the 
global level has been key in forming an extra- regional alliance with peer coun-
tries – namely, G4 – with the purpose of putting pressure on the existing perma-
nent members of the UNSC to reform the institution. However, this enterprise 
mismatches with what Brazil has discursively articulated at the regional level, 
where the role of entrepreneurial leader is accepted over the self- serving role of 
structural leader, especially if sharing this latter role with regional others is not 
an option.
The regional others – Argentina and Chile
Argentina sees Brazil as a competitive partner. It sees Brazil as a partner in the 
creation and function of the MERCOSUR (Taiana 2006: 12). ‘Argentina sees 
this partnership as based on an equal footing and not on Brazilian supremacy’ 
(see Gomes Saraiva and Malamud 2009: 17). This image of a certain equality is 
related to Argentina’s traditional view of Brazil as a competitor for the exertion 
of influence in South America, and thus it constantly seeks allies to balance 
against Brazil (Russell and Tokatlian 2003). This competition has become more 
asymmetrical, favouring Brazil as Argentina has experienced consecutive crises 
that have undermined its potentiality to be a proactive, relevant actor in the 
South American region. The crisis of 2001 affected Argentina’s economic per-
formance in the region, which also compromised the transformation of the 
MERCOSUR into a Customs Union (Bouzas et al. 2002: 129). In fact, both 
countries, Brazil and Argentina, are the countries that implement the lesser of 
the MERCOSUR regulations. This fits in with Brazil’s downgrading of the 
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MERCOSUR as an economic project and its upgrading of the MERCOSUR to 
be a political platform. On the political side, the achievements are more signific-
ant as both Brazil and Argentina have shared the role of structural leader to 
secure the democratic stability of Paraguay. With the inclusion of Venezuela in 
the MERCOSUR, Argentina has seen in this new regional member an ally to 
soft- balance Brazil within and beyond the MERCOSUR, and to reduce the 
extant asymmetry between the two countries (cf. Simonoff 2008: 49).
 Part of this perception of Brazil as a competitive partner, that is, equal footing 
and not supremacy, suggests that Argentina aspires to play the joint role of entre-
preneurial leader with Brazil in the institutionalization and crisis management duties 
of the UNASUR. In this regard, Argentina’s interest is to secure a predominant 
position in Brazil’s foreign policy, as well as to play the role of soft- balancer of 
Brazil within the UNASUR. The recent election of Kirchner as the UNASUR 
Secretary- General not only reflects his personal interest in using the post as a plat-
form for a new presidential nomination, as well as the partnership between both 
countries, but it also responds to the need of unfolding a balancing behaviour 
towards Brazil. The sharing of the role of entrepreneurial leader between Argentina 
and Brazil within the UNASUR became evident in their dual effort to facilitate the 
dialogue between Colombia and Venezuela, during the crisis of July–August 2010.
 However, the dual exertion of the role of structural leader within the MER-
COSUR, and of entrepreneurial leader in the crisis management duties of the 
UNASUR blurs at the global level, especially, as Argentina sees Brazil’s quest 
for a permanent seat in the UNSC as a self- serving rather than selves- serving 
enterprise. In principle, Argentina is not against the role of structural leader if it 
involves a principle of sharing, as the actions of Brazil and Argentina within the 
MERCOSUR and the UNASUR illustrate. However, the permanent seat 
excludes Argentina from Brazil’s power equation, and it creates the fear that the 
power gap between the two countries will increase, transforming the extant part-
nership into a type of subordination. For this reason, Argentina has joined the 
group ‘Uniting for Consensus’ along with Italy, Pakistan and others to balance 
Brazil’s and the rest of the G4 members’ quest for a permanent seat in the 
UNSC. Argentina favours a reform in the UNSC, yet one with new non- 
permanent members (see Bielsa 2005: 4). This view is also consistent with the 
desire and the proposal of Argentina to have a permanent regional seat for Latin 
America based upon a rotation system (Mayoral 2004). These proposals are also 
consistent with the view of competitive partnership and with the idea of prevent-
ing an even larger asymmetric relationship between Argentina and Brazil, which 
might eventually erase the need for such a partnership in Brazil’s foreign policy.
 Chile sees Brazil as an important ally in South America. Chile has an ambigu-
ous and sceptical view about regional groupings such as that of the MERCO-
SUR, especially regarding a group political agenda. In fact, Chile has conducted 
a balancing strategy towards the MERCOSUR by being only an associate 
member and, at the same time, by trying to reduce the economic dependence and 
its possible political influence by pursing an aggressive free trade agreement 
policy both within and beyond Latin America (see Wehner 2010b).
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 Regarding the formation of the UNASUR, as well as its ongoing process of 
institutionalization, Chile has also shown its scepticism about the viability of this 
project. This is the case despite the fact that the then president Michelle Bachelet 
(2006–10) served as the UNASUR pro- temporare president from May 2008 to 
August 2009. Chile’s reservations about integration schemes are expressed by 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs Mariano Fernández (2009–10):
The multilateral efforts for integration in Latin American do not have a 
happy destiny. For this reason, from the beginning of the Concertación gov-
ernments, and without abandoning the integration spirit, [Chile] also uses 
the practical and effective way of bilateral accords on the Latin American 
continent; like, for example, the ambitious Treaty of Integration of Maipu 
signed between Chile and Argentina.
(Fernández 2010: 4)
Chile’s view of Brazil is overall a positive one, as the latter represents to Chile a 
structural ally (Álvarez and Fuentes 2007). However, Chile prioritizes the bilateral 
dialogue with Brazil over regional integration to prevent a political and commer-
cial entrapment within the MERCOSUR. On security issues and crisis manage-
ment, Chile welcomes and has shared the role of entrepreneurial leader with Brazil 
– on the initiative of the latter – to mediate through the use of consensus and dia-
logue in cases such as that of the institutional crisis in Bolivia in 2008. Whereas 
Chile accepts, encourages and shapes Brazil’s role as an entrepreneurial leader in 
South America, it does it when it comes to third countries, and it contests and 
rejects such a role if Chile is one of the parties in the conflicting dialogue, as it was 
with the issue of sea access for Bolivia in 2003 (Latin American Security and Stra-
tegic Review 2003: 2; Wehner 2010a: 17). In addition, Chile also expects from 
Brazil’s role performance that it uses its consensual skills and persuasion to mod-
erate the rhetoric of Chávez, in case it targets Chile as a result of the current ideo-
logical divisions between these countries – accentuated recently by the election of 
a president, Sebastián Piñera (2010–), from the political right in Chile.
 Chile’s role prescription to Brazil at the global level is ambiguous. Chile sees 
in Brazil’s quest for global power status and in its aspiration to reform multilat-
eral institutions a means to manifest its own national interests. However, Chile 
also indirectly contests Brazil’s role of structural leader when it claims a right to 
a permanent seat in the UNSC with full rights. The Chilean representative at the 
UN stated that:
At the bilateral level, Chile has supported the aspiration of Brazil and also 
of Germany, India and Japan to occupy a permanent seat in the Security 
Council. Their membership would improve the representativity of the 
Council. . . . Chile makes a specific reservation with regard to the granting of 
the right of veto to the new permanent members, whether this is immediate 
or subject to a suspension or moratorium of its exercise.
(Muñoz 2005: 3)
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Thus, Chile’s opposition to grant veto rights may create a status problem for 
Brazil in its aspiration to being accepted as an equal and accepted into the big 
global players group, if these veto rights are maintained among the five tradi-
tional members.4
Conclusion
By neglecting in its public discourse leadership associated with negative means, 
Brazil has been able to self- define, enact and perform the role of entrepreneurial 
leader in South America in a salient way. This role is based on the notions of con-
sensus, dialogue, inclusiveness and mediation, without enforcing conformity and 
cooperation from other neighbouring countries. Nevertheless, the role of structural 
leader has not been completely absent from Brazil’s actions on the South American 
stage; yet, its performative character – sticks – has been limited to crisis manage-
ment within the MERCOSUR’s small member states, such as Paraguay. In these 
cases, Brazil has not played such a role in a unilateral way, as sharing the stage with 
Argentina has made its performance viable. Despite the fact that Brazil has per-
formed the role of structural leader on the South American scene, it lacks a defined 
discursive articulation, because Brazil has consciously downgraded from its public 
discourse the concepts of leadership associated with enforcement and coercion.
 The discursive articulation of the role of entrepreneurial leader allows for sharing 
and broader acceptance among regional others. What remains to be analysed is why 
these others prescribe, and accept, this role. Three tentative answers that need to be 
further explored in future are that regional others may be able to shape and influ-
ence Brazil’s roles and interests, as well as reduce Brazil’s room to manoeuvre 
within South America; that through the ascription and acceptance of Brazil’s role of 
entrepreneurial leader, especially regarding actions towards regional others and not 
towards these two secondary powers – Argentina and Chile, these countries can 
reduce the probability that Brazil will unfold a project based on hegemonic suprem-
acy; and that these secondary powers’ room to manoeuvre increases as the negative 
consequences for choosing not to follow Brazil in some occasions are minimized as 
‘sticks’ are not part of this country regional repertoire towards secondary regional 
powers. Therefore, the going alone of Brazil when it sought a permanent seat in the 
UNSC was too far away from the co- constitution of roles between the self- 
conception and the role prescription coming from the secondary regional powers, 
and the expectations of behaviour that emanate from the social process of co- 
constituting roles.
 The roles of entrepreneurial, intellectual and structural leaders exist in the dis-
courses and actions of regional powers. Role theory and leadership theory can 
contribute to a better understanding, from an actor- centred perspective, of how 
regional powers conceptualize their place in both the regional and global milieus, 
as well as how others ascribe, shape, accept or reject such roles. Thus, leadership 
is not only a typology with easily delineated characteristics. Types of leaderships 
are also fluid and context- specific roles that are conceived and performed 
socially between the self and the other.
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Notes
1 An exception is the work of Chaban et al. (2006), which assesses how others see the 
EU as an international actor.
2 Words in italics are originals from the text.
3 Words within brackets are the author’s own addition.
4 In a draft proposal Brazil, along with the other G4 countries, proposed a reform for 
more permanent seats with veto rights. However, this was left out due to the lack of 
followership from countries that supported the permanent seat for these countries. As a 
result, the G4 proposed instead a review of the veto system in 15 years (Kern 2005: 
1–2).
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